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Abstract The paper considers the implementation of a virtual manufacturing system as an
alternative to outward technology licensing in a high technology industrial sector. Brief theoretical
definition and description of the two strategy options is provided to give background and context.
This is followed by empirical material from a longitudinal case study of a company that has
developed a virtual manufacturing system in addition to its pre-existing outward technology
licensing business stream. A summary account of the company history and development is followed
by description of the virtual manufacturing proposal. Analysis of this identified a number of
competencies that would be required in order to succeed. The final part of the paper describes the
company’s response to this analysis and discusses early implementation of the virtual system. It is
shown that implementation of the proposal has represented a positive response to the business
challenges facing the company.
Introduction
Organisations within contemporary business environments are increasingly
required to react and cope with competitive pressures deriving from a variety
of sources. These include the globalisation of economic activity, increased
innovation and rapid technological change and the increased power of
customers (Barnes and Hunt, 2001, p. 139). Virtual systems are emerging as
business models that aim to integrate market, product, and manufacturing
strategies for the twenty-first century. It is said that the virtual organisation
may provide the flexible, cohesive and synergistic business model necessary to
operate successfully in the current business climate (Barnes and Hunt, 2001,
p. 139; Introna, 2001). The agility associated with such fluid and flexible
organisational forms is key to providing efficient and effective response to
increasingly sophisticated customer demands. With this in mind, the work
presented in this paper sought to address two principal research questions:
RQ1. Does the virtual manufacturing model offer a commercially viable
operations strategy for the exploitation of product-related technology?
RQ2. What competencies and capabilities are pre-requisite to successful
implementation of such a strategy?
The paper considers the implementation of a virtual manufacturing system by
a company that had previously operated with only a technology licensing
business stream. It presents theoretical background material to give context to
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the case study that is the subject of the main part of the paper. This includes
definition and discussion of virtual manufacturing. An account of the company
history is followed by a description of the virtual system proposal. This has
been analysed in order to identify the competencies necessary for successful
implementation. The means by which the necessary resources and skills were
acquired and/or developed is followed by a description of the current status of
the operation. The significance of the work is highlighted.
Background and context
The appropriate choice of operations strategy is key to the commercial success
of any enterprise and is a critical issue for operations management. For
companies that manufacture products, strategy options have been modelled on
Williamson’s organisational continuum, and range from “internalisation” to
“contracting” (Toms and Filatotchev, 2002; Williamson, 1975). These options
map to conventional and virtual manufacturing, respectively. The emphasis in
this model, however, and in much of the seminal work within the operations
strategy field (e.g. Skinner, 1985; Hayes and Wheelwright, 1984; Hayes et al.,
1988), has been on strategy development for ex antemanufacturing businesses.
For companies with a non-manufacturing background, such as those that
develop and sell technology, the Williamson continuum needs to be extended
through contracting to exploitation options that do not require any
involvement in product manufacture (Webster and Sugden, 2001a).
Alongside operations strategy, recognised technology and innovation
strategies are seen as integral parts of an overall strategic architecture to
inform and equip an organisation for operating within the new global business
environment (Banerjee, 2000; Phaal et al., 2001). Central to the innovation
strategy of manufacturing companies, is the make-or-buy decision relating to
technology development activity – of product and/or process (e.g. Ca´n˜ez and
Probert, 1998; Chiesa et al., 2000). For some companies, a more appropriate
decision may to be “make-and-buy” (Veugelers and Cassiman, 1999). By
contrast, the innovation strategy of technology developers – particularly those
that develop product technology – involves the decision either to profit from
the sale of the technology (e.g. by licensing-out) or from self-exploitation (by
conventional manufacturing) (Arora et al., 2001). Put more crudely, the decision
can be thought of as one of “use-or-sell”, with the additional possibility of
“use-and-sell”. Resolution of the decisions to make/buy or to use/sell within the
innovation strategy of an organisation, is inextricably linked with the choice of
operations strategy on the continuum from conventional manufacturing,
through virtual manufacturing, to outward licensing.
In order to provide sufficiently detailed theoretical context for the case study
that is to follow, the remainder of this section of the paper considers strategy
options for the exploitation of product technology. Virtual manufacturing is
considered in some detail, as this represents an option for both ex ante
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manufacturing companies as well as for those that traditionally “sell” product
technology. It also represents an emerging business form of contemporary
interest within the operations management field.
Operations strategies for the exploitation of product technology
For organisations that are involved in new technology research and
development, exploitation routes generally exist through the design and sale
of products. For these, much of their competitive advantage derives from the
successful protection of the technology leading to retention over its control, and
from an ability to effect rapid market penetration. These twin objectives inform
the choice and implementation of operations strategy, which traditionally have
ranged on a continuum between the two extremes of licensing-out (selling) and
conventional manufacturing (using). These involve the development and use of
altogether different operations capabilities and competencies.
Outward technology licensing is an exploitation mechanism whereby
independent organisations pay for protected design data and the right to use
the technology in production processes or in products that they manufacture
and sell as their own (Lowe and Crawford, 1984a, b; Arora et al., 2001). A licence
can be defined as an agreement by which one company (the licensor) grants
another (the licensee) the right to use its intellectual property for a defined
purpose. The technology originator (licensor) generally profits from the
payment of up-front fees and on-going royalty fees in proportion to the
commercial success of the exploited technology. It usually has no involvement
in the manufacturing process. In general terms, the use of technology licensing
supports the increasingly advocated business strategy of focus on core
competencies. The licensor retains its competence in technology development
and the licensee concentrates on its competencies in the exploitation of
technology through product manufacture (Webster and Sugden, 2001a, b).
At the other extreme is the establishment of comprehensive in-house
manufacturing facilities in order to build products designed around the
protected technology, thus “using” it directly. In this scenario, the technology
originator is required to develop a full range of competencies in the
manufacturing processes used and in activities that support the manufacturing
function. This option requires significant investment in manufacturing
facilities and supporting resources.
However, to keep investment costs under control and to restrict uncertainties
about the manufacturing capabilities of the company, an operations strategy
based on a disaggregated or extended enterprise could be envisaged (Banerjee,
2000). This strategic architecture is increasingly linked to the concept of virtual
manufacturing, which presents itself as an alternative business model
(e.g. Christie and Levary, 1998; Reid et al., 1996a, b; Schumacher et al., 1996;
Introna, 2001). This involves the creation of networks of independent agents,
each specialising in their own key skills. The true virtual manufacturer has no
internal manufacturing capability at all, but outsources all physical production
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functions to suppliers and subcontractors. By marshalling external
competencies, a virtual environment is said to improve responsiveness,
product and process design, manufacturing design and operation, and to
reduce manufacturing risk (Gunasekaran, 1999). A virtual manufacturing
system is fluid and re-configurable. It has the agility to be both highly
responsive and highly flexible in the light of dynamic customer needs. Using
this approach to technology exploitation, the technology originator could
design and develop “own-label” products, but use a network of independent
suppliers and subcontractors for manufacture. This represents an intermediate
position on the continuum described and requires a compromise in terms of
skills and competencies. The organisation is required to organise, manage and
plan manufacturing but it is not required to develop specific manufacturing
process skills or to invest in manufacturing resources (Webster and Sugden,
2001a, b). However, it is benefiting from “using” the developed technology,
rather than from “selling” it.
Virtual manufacturing
The virtual enterprise is widely discussed as an emerging organisational form
that may be able to meet the challenges of operating in business in the future.
However, there is confusion over the concept of virtuality and, more specifically
in relation to this paper, over the definition and characteristics of virtual
manufacturing. This has been defined alternatively as the modelling and
simulation of manufacturing systems (Lin and Fu, 2001), of manufacturing
processes (Offodile and Abdel-Malek, 2002) and of prototype manufacture
(Waller, 1999). The majority of work in the area, however, views it as the
manufacture of a tangible product using a network of geographically-
dispersed, independent manufacturing partners. It is frequently linked with
organisational agility (Meade et al., 1996; Marshall et al., 2001; Harrison, 1997;
Katzy and Dissel, 2001). As such, it is sometimes characterised by its
temporary formation from a cluster of potential partners (Reid et al., 1996a;
Meade et al., 1996; Lackenby and McBain, 1999) in order to respond to a specific
business opportunity before dissolution once the opportunity has been met
(Marshall et al., 2001; Lau and Wong, 2001; Meade et al., 1996; Lackenby and
McBain, 1999). A virtual manufacturing network, while consisting of separate
partners, gives the appearance of acting as a single enterprise (Rupp and Ristic,
2000; Rautenstrauch and Turowski, 1999; Lackenby and McBain, 1999). Its
defining characteristics and features are generally agreed to be networked
manufacturing (Upton and McAfee, 1996; Lau and Wong, 2001; Panteli and
Dibben, 2001); geographical dispersion (Lau and Wong, 2001; Rupp and Ristic,
2000; Panteli and Dibben, 2001); and strategic alliances and partnerships
(Introna, 2001; Rupp and Ristic, 2000). There is less general agreement, but
some consensus as to the temporary nature of the enterprise and the essential
use of information technology (IT) to manage the partnerships involved.
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Critical success factors for virtual manufacturing have been proposed. These
include the effective management of order flow, production planning and
scheduling (Richards et al., 1997; Rupp and Ristic, 2000; Schumacher et al.,
1996); trust and co-operation among partners (Lackenby and McBain, 1999;
Marshall et al., 2001; Katzy and Dissel, 2001); and shared purpose, risk and
benefit (Marshall et al., 2001). There is additionally a considerable body of
thought proposing that appropriate use of sophisticated IT is critical to
successful implementation (e.g. Upton and McAfee, 1996; Schultze and
Orlikowski, 2001; Rautenstrauch and Turowski, 1999; Martinez et al., 2001).
However, this proposal is countered by others who do not regard the use of IT
as essential (Quereshi and Zigurs, 2001; Panteli and Dibben, 2001; Katzy and
Dissel, 2001). Lau and Wong (2001) identify the selection of manufacturing
partners and the capability of the information flow infrastructure (not
necessarily technology-based) as key facilitators. Katzy and Dissel (2001) argue
that in implementing virtual manufacturing, there is a need to move away from
traditional decision and planning systems, such as MRP/ERP. These, they
argue, prevent fast reactions (essential to agility/virtuality), and lead to the
need for innovative approaches in order to ensure success.
Few authors specifically consider the reasons for the existence of virtual
organisations. However, as mentioned above, they are frequently linked with the
pursuit of agility, where agility is the capability to succeed in situations of
unpredictable change (Katzy and Dissel, 2001). Having the ability to temporarily
and co-operatively configure resources and competencies from a geographically-
dispersed network of independent partners provides the means to bring products
to market in minimum time (Harrison, 1997). From the perspective of ex ante
manufacturing companies, adoption of a virtual approach is said to benefit SMEs
by facilitating the development of the critical mass normally associated with a
larger firm (Lackenby and McBain, 1999) and to benefit OEMs by providing
advantages associated with margins, capital, time-to-market, geographic
expansion, flexibility and specialisation (Ansley, 2000).
A general lack of empirical work in the area of virtual manufacturing and of
published practical experience with this form of organisation has been noted
(Marshall et al., 2001; Schultze and Orlikowsky, 2001). Limited work has been
reported, but this has focused on cases of the adoption of a virtual approach by
individual (or networks of) ex ante manufacturing companies (e.g. Richards
et al., 1997; Siqueira and Bremer, 2000; Reid et al., 1996a; Katzy and Dissel,
2001; Gordon and Gordon, 1996; Ansley, 2000;Webster, 2001). Indeed, Reid et al.
(1996b, p. 485) argue that “among the most interesting competitive strategies
being explored by manufacturing firms is the concept of the virtual enterprise”.
Discussion of the adoption of the virtual approach by non-manufacturing
companies is noticeably absent from the literature. Similarly, apart from a few
rather imprecise accounts (e.g. Upton and McAfee, 1996; Ansley, 2000; Gordon
and Gordon, 1996) there is a dearth of work describing the practical
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implementation of virtual manufacturing. This suggests that there is a need for
empirical research to corroborate or counter the theoretical perspectives on
virtual manufacturing. The empirical work to be presented in this paper
addresses this research gap. It provides detailed practical findings from a single
longitudinal case study about the reasons for adopting virtual manufacturing,
about its implementation and about its ability to contribute to business success.
The case concerns the implementation of virtual manufacturing by a company
that had previously used only outward licensing to generate business success.
The remaining parts of the paper present an account of the methodology
used to develop the case study, company history, background to the decision to
extend operations strategies, and a description of the virtual manufacturing
system. The analysis of company competencies that was carried out at the
proposal stage is then used to frame a discussion of the early implementation of
the virtual manufacturing system. Throughout the case description, where
appropriate, the decisions and actions taken are discussed in relation to the
theoretical perspectives provided in the early part of the paper.
Methodology
According to Parker (1991, p. 19) “organisations exist to develop or perfect
technologies, and then license them. Their business is technology development
for sale”. This scenario applies to the company that has collaborated with this
work. Although this type of business is not unique, it is relatively rare (Arora
et al., 2001). The research significance of the longitudinal case study developed
from investigating unique or rare cases is high (Yin, 1989). The research to
generate the case study presented in this paper was undertaken by a
combination of action research and detached academic observation and input.
(In order to avoid repetitious citation in the text, it is noted here that the
description of the methodology relies heavily on the work of Coughlan and
Coghlan (2002). Unless otherwise stated, all points made about the action
research approach, are drawn from their overview paper of action research
methods in operations management).
Action research aims both to take action and to create knowledge or theory
about that action. It is a process that fundamentally explores change and is said
to be applicable to the understanding, planning and implementation of change in
business firms. It requires broad pre-understanding of the corporate environment
in which it is carried out, and is therefore considered a suitable approach for an
existing company manager to investigate a particular business issue.
Interestingly, providing some precedent for the adoption of this approach, one
of the few other reported cases of the implementation of virtual manufacturing
was based on an action research project (Siqueira and Bremer, 2000).
The research is based on an initial study started in 1998 as an MBA
management project by one of the authors (Sugden, 1999). He was, at that time,
working in a business development role for the sister to the case company, but
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subsequently became managing director of the case company. The MBA
project work coincided with the launch of an in-company strategy review to
consider the option of self-exploitation for the technology that it had previously
only exploited by outward licensing. Virtual manufacturing was suggested as
an option, and the MBA project incorporated a feasibility study to explore this.
This led to a proposal for implementation and an analysis of the competencies
that would be required to bring about success. The research has continued
since submission of the MBA report in December 1999, and remains actively
undertaken in parallel with the operation of the business. During both the MBA
project and the subsequent implementation and operation of virtual
manufacturing, the in-company actions have been supported by a process of
reflection and learning. This has been facilitated by the involvement of an
independent academic, initially as MBA project supervisor and thereafter as
independent observer. The role of the academic has been to encourage the
appropriate analysis of plans made and actions taken, in order to ensure that
the action research cycle has been rigorously applied and that the processes of
data exploration have been undertaken in a methodical and orderly way. The
longitudinal case study, started formally in 1998, continues to develop as a
result of the deliberate action research process of “planning, taking action and
evaluating the action, leading to further planning” (Coughlan and Coghlan,
2002, p. 223). It meets the requirements for action research because it is both
participative (on the part of the in-company researcher) and concurrent with the
action that is taking place within the company.
Case study
Company history
For reasons of commercial confidentiality, identification of the collaborating
firm is not possible, and it will be referred to as TLC (for Technology Licensing
Company). The company designs and develops electrical motors and
controllers using design-protected technology which gives improved product
performance at lower cost than conventional motor technology. The founding
technology from which TLC originated was developed by research staff at two
UK universities in the late 1960s and, at that time, represented a significant
advance in product technology. Commercially protected, industrially-
sponsored research into the technology followed and related product
development continued throughout the 1970s. In 1980, the industrial sponsor
withdrew, and the founding academics established TLC as a commercial
enterprise for the licensing of the developed technology. The rationale behind
this decision was based on the core competencies of the founders who had little
experience of product manufacturing or marketing, but considerable expertise
in engineering research, design and development. This expertise included the
very low volume manufacture of prototypes of products incorporating the
technology, built for actual and potential licensees. This activity involved
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in-house workshop-based assembly of externally sourced components, and led
to the development of skills in managing prototype manufacture. At this stage,
the founders were confident of the commercial viability of the technology, but
less sure of their competence in managing full-scale exploitation through
conventional manufacturing. It was further felt that by selling the rights to
exploit the technology, minimal investment in the newly-founded enterprise
would be required. Up-front fees would cover continuing research and
development costs, while profits would derive from royalty receipts. This
strategy accords with the ability of entrepreneurial start-ups to appropriate
returns on their innovation efforts without the need to mobilise the substantial
resources needed for internal application (Arora et al., 2001).
Following the acquisition of a site, the technology development and
engineering team was increased, and considerable commercial success
followed. By the early 1990s TLC’s pioneering technology was much in
demand. Potential users were restricted either to licensing it in or to risk
infringing TLC’s intellectual property rights. At that time, a major global
corporation (with annual sales in 1994 of $8.6 billion) wanted to expand its
technology portfolio into the area developed by TLC. It was already operating
successfully in the research, design, development, manufacturing, marketing
and sales of products in industrial automation, industrial process control,
domestic appliance technology and motor technology. In order to provide
licence coverage for all its potential applications, however, it would have
needed to buy many licences. Instead, it made more financial sense to purchase
the company itself. Thus, ownership of TLC transferred from the original
founders to its new global parent. The acquisition of TLC also meant that the
parent company now had strategic control over the release to competitors of the
specialist technology. Since that time, TLC has continued to operate as a quasi-
independent unit within its larger corporate environment.
With the change of ownership came pressures to change the mode of
company operation. TLC was to undertake an intensive patenting programme
in order to fully protect its intellectual property, and was only permitted to
license out its technology to firms that did not compete with any subsidiaries of
the owner. Additionally, commercial pressures began to restrict the success of
the licensing of the original technology. Competitors were developing similar
technology, high investment costs restricted potential licensees to large
companies, and investment costs in further internal development of the
technology were high. The parent company, with its primary focus on mass
product manufacture and sale, was uncertain of the value of further investment
in development at TLC. Company survival, therefore, depended on a change of
operations strategy that could be shown to have potential to generate
commercial success into the future.
Staff at TLC remained confident that many potential applications of
controlled motors, built using their technology, existed. These included
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applications in electrical products manufactured by small companies that do
not have the technical or financial ability to license-in TLC know-how. For
them, use of TLC technology offers the potential to provide market edge and to
expand business through price savings, improved product performance
characteristics, customisation to specific needs and the provision of
marketdifferentiation for their end-products. These organisations represent
an untapped market where, typically, they now buy off-the-shelf motors, built
using conventional technology. The number of enquiries received by TLC from
buyers seeking motors incorporating the technology far exceeds the number of
enquiries by potential licensees.
At TLC, in order to pursue these perceived opportunities for growth within
the restrictions placed on them by the parent company, the concept of a
“product incubator” (a term coined by the company) was born. This was
envisaged as a product development and manufacturing environment based on
principles of virtual manufacturing. It aimed to make and sell products to
customer order, generally in low volumes and at low cost to the customer, but
at high profit. It was to be established with minimum capital outlay. A model
for the structure and operation of the product incubator follows.
Product incubator proposal
The majority of customers for controlled motors using TLC technology are
industrial original equipment manufacturers (OEMs). The motors are
incorporated as components into a range of domestic and industrial end-
products. Typical applications involve the use of a variable speed electric
motor operating outside the range of conventional technology, such as
operating at high speed or operating in hostile environments. They include
industrial and commercial sliding doors, washing machines, underground
mining conveyors, air-conditioning units, laboratory centrifuges and industrial
air compressors. Profit margins tend to be greater for high-power motors
produced in low volumes (e.g. for mining applications) than they are for low-
power motors that are made in high volumes (e.g. for washing machines).
Additionally, for high-volume, low-power motors, minimal variety means that
dedicated flowline manufacturing systems are able to achieve short lead times.
By contrast, for the low-volume, high-power motors that are often built to
order, lead times tend to be protracted. Manufacturing systems for this market
sector require flexibility. It was the intention of TLC to compete on the basis of
price and lead time on controlled motors primarily in the low-volume, high-
power sector. It intended to identify specialist products for niche markets and
to be responsive to these opportunities as they arose. TLC Manufacturing Ltd.
(TLCML) was to be established as a separate company operating within a
purpose-built facility at the TLC site.
The complexity of the TLC technology and of products built using it derives
from the innovative use of the technology within motor and controller design,
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and from the specialist manufacturing processes associated with parts of the
product-build. A standard product consists of a motor linked to a separate
electronic controller. The components for the controller, including custom-
designed parts incorporating TLC technology, can be sourced from a number of
manufacturers. The motor, on the other hand, requires highly specialised
manufacturing processes which are not widely available. Assembly of the
motor and controller into a finished product is followed by full product test. As
mentioned earlier, TLC was already manufacturing prototype-controlled
motors using a variety of suppliers and subcontractors. The controllers were
multi-sourced. An existing TLC licensee, which had a purpose-built assembly
and test facility for motors, also acted as a subcontractor and provided these for
TLC prototypes. Final prototype assembly and test was achieved in-house
within TLC’s engineering workshop.
In creating the product incubator, TLCML proposed to build on its prototype
activity and to establish a manufacturing system based on a number of
distributed, independent manufacturing units. These would include suppliers
of both controller and motor components drawn from the existing portfolio of
prototype collaborators. Some components would be sourced from sister
companies within the parent company. The supply of motors for the incubator
was the most critical, as fewer capable suppliers existed and because volumes
would be greater than the existing level of prototype activity. In the early
planning stages for the incubator, TLCML had intended to develop its own
in-house manufacturing facility for motors. However, the existing prototype
supplier at that time stopped manufacturing motors under licence and it sold
its motor manufacturing facility to TLCML. It was also planned that this
remote site be used for the final assembly, test and dispatch of finished
products.
At its home site, TLCML would perform business activities such as sales
and marketing, customer interfacing, quotations, order-processing and
invoicing. It would also be responsible internally for such manufacturing
support activities as production planning, scheduling, materials planning
and procurement, kit marshalling, controlling, and progressing. Accounting,
custom product design and sales agency functions would be sourced to the
sister TLC organisation. Figure 1 summarises the network organisation that
was to be established to profit from “using” the technology in the
manufacture of tangible products. Referring back to the discussion given
earlier, it can be seen that the model proposed for the product incubator was
derived from principles of virtual manufacturing. It was to be based on a
geographically dispersed network of owned and independent supply
partners; and it was to (temporarily) configure design and manufacturing
capability from partners and strategic allies, as appropriate, in order to
respond to niche product development opportunities as they arose (i.e. it was
to have agility).
Implementation
of virtual
manufacturing
457
Analysis of the proposal
It is said that the creation and building of core competencies is difficult, and
that it is essential for management to list existing capabilities in order to
identify missing links (Yusuf et al., 1999). These, it is suggested, can then be
in-sourced or acquired through alliance. At the incubator proposal stage,
Figure 1.
Summary of the network
organisation adopted for
the product incubator
IJOPM
23,5
458
detailed analysis of the competencies likely to be needed for successful
operation was carried out (Webster and Sugden, 2001a, b). This analysis
formed part of the ongoing action research and it incorporated both internal
and external (independent) perspectives. A number of dedicated meetings were
held between the academic observer and the managing director over a period of
several weeks to discuss competence and capability requirements for
implementation of the proposal. As part of this process, the plan was
examined in the light of nine factors said to contribute to the success of virtual
enterprises (Christie and Levary, 1998). These factors relate to issues associated
with customer focus, business partners, communication, technology,
information, organisation, leadership and worker qualities. For each of these
areas, existing competencies at TLCML were noted, and gaps that would need
to be addressed were identified. Details of the analysis are summarised in
columns two and three of Table I. Actions taken in order to address the
competence gaps are discussed.
Actions taken in order to develop/acquire the necessary competencies
There follows an account of how TLCML has addressed each of the missing
competencies identified through analysis and listed in column three of Table I.
It is of additional interest that as a new or revised organisational form is
implemented it is said that the development or acquisition of necessary
competencies and skills is generally a gradual process as the organisation
learns and adapts (e.g. Harland and Knight, 2001; Shepherd et al., 2000). It
should be noted that the company continues to monitor and review its
competence portfolio as the implementation proceeds and as business develops.
Product development skills and marketing expertise.On the formation of
TLCML, a number of directors and senior staff transferred from TLC. These
included people with experience of the industry, products and technology and
with expertise in product development and marketing and sales activity.
Marketing/sales skills and knowledge were transferred with one of the
founding directors who moved from a similar role in TLC and took
responsibility for this activity. He soon established working links with
independent commission-based marketing agents, who continue to provide
remote support. Competencies in product development were also transferred at
director level. These had been gained by assisting former licensees with
activities such as re-designing prototypes for production, managing contract
PCB design, designing and sourcing tooling, selecting subcontract PCB
assemblers and managing pre-production/first years’ manufacture. These
competencies were initially restricted to the controller and were used
immediately for product development in TLCML. There remained, however, an
early need to develop expertise in other aspects of the product architecture.
Specific motor and motor application skills were bought in as part of the motor
facility acquisition. Additional technical skills and regulatory knowledge have
been (and continue to be) accessed through a technical centre within the parent
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group and through an independent UK-based certification and approvals
provider. Product design and development activity continues to be handled by
a mix of internal engineering skills (including the recent transfer from TLC of a
senior engineer as engineering director), outsourcing (mainly to TLC) and
customer involvement.
Supply system management.This is an area in which TLC had only limited
in-house experience. Supply management skills were initially bought in with
the recruitment of an experienced manufacturing manager before the launch of
TLCML. This facilitated the development of a strategic supplier reduction
programme and operational systems for supply prior to manufacture. For
several months during start-up he was able to evaluate suppliers. One of the
criteria for selection (in addition to quality, delivery and price issues) was the
extent to which they could supply multiple components and thus prevent the
proliferation of suppliers. The role of purchasing for the motors and controllers
was originally separated and shared between the recruited manufacturing
manager and one of the founding directors. However, as soon as the income
stream could support it, a procurement specialist was employed to co-ordinate
purchasing for both components over both owned sites. A production manager
and an electro-mechanical engineer at each site provide support for this
function.
Relationships with suppliers to be consolidated and developed. As TLCML
began manufacturing, many of the prototype component suppliers for TLC
started to benefit from volume business. Similarly, pre-existing suppliers to the
motor facility were retained and given steady volume requirements. A number
of new suppliers were added, including some which already supplied to the
global mass-manufacturing parent under price-favourable, high-volume supply
deals. For these, TLCML has benefited from globally-negotiated cost
advantages. Supplier development is an ongoing process and relationships
continue to mature. TLCML staff regularly participate in “supplier days” and
company visits through one of the company’s major customers. Here, they
work with their own tier – one suppliers, and with other suppliers to their
customer on programmes of cost reduction, quality, design, and supply. With
the recruitment of specialist purchasing expertise it is planned that further
supplier development initiatives of this sort will be undertaken.
Development of operational systems for effective manufacturing and supply
system management.The manufacturing manager recruited before company
launch, played a pivotal role in the establishment of operational systems for
effective manufacturing and supply system management. This included
setting up practices and procedures for manufacturing support (e.g. operations
planning, inventory control, purchasing) and for costing (including activity-
based costing, invoicing, etc.). The software necessary to support these
activities was scoped and specified. An ERP-based, fully integrated package
was subsequently purchased. This is installed across both home sites with a
data link to allow real-time data access from both. There are no direct IT links
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with any network partners. Upstream, the management of supply is
implemented using conventional ordering/dispatching/communication
methods such as telephone, fax and e-mail. This works well and integration
of systems is not currently regarded as necessary for success. Looking
downstream, there are currently two major customers – one has neither the
wish nor the resources to integrate with TLCML’s internal ERP system, and the
other orders only very limited numbers of high-value products. In this situation
there is little perceived benefit to either partner in integrating software
systems. According to much of the theoretical discussion on virtual enterprises
(and summarised earlier in the paper), IT links with network partners (both
suppliers and customers) is a critical factor for success. The practice seen at
TLCML contradicts this view. As discussed later in the paper, business success
has been achieved through the implementation of a form of virtual
manufacturing, without the need for IT system integration.
Review of virtual manufacturing company structure. In common with most
company start-ups the organisational structure for TLCML continues to evolve
as practical and business needs dictate. The initial structure was based around
a professional and flexible workforce supported by effective communication.
As business has grown the company structure has been monitored. The need
for new functions has been identified and addressed by the modification and
formalisation of existing roles and by the creation of new ones. The company
has retained its agility and responsiveness by using principles of virtual
manufacturing and by nurturing its culture of resource flexibility. It has a
network of business partners from which it draws capability as necessary in
order to meet its customers’ needs. Review of structure is a component of
agility and is a feature of the virtual approach to organisation. It continues to
form a significant part of strategic management activity within TLCML.
Continuing pressures on the company from the business environment and from
its parent preclude complacency. It is recognised that continuing business
success and even company survival depends on a corporate culture that
embraces change. This has to date restricted the extent of employee resistance
to change.
Need for additional leadership, managerial and administrative skills. As
outlined, the managerial structure initially consisted largely of senior staff
transferred from TLC and of recruited specialist staff. The two founding
managing directors had between them a mix of industry experience,
management qualification and leadership flair. The company’s initial
experience and skills base included competencies in the management of
engineering and manufacturing activity and in industrial marketing. The
company was additionally fortunate in having access to the supporting skill
resources of its parent and sister companies. As business developed, additional
skills were acquired through direct employment (e.g. for procurement and
product development), and through recruitment of freelance specialists (e.g. for
marketing and manufacturing support functions). A programme of employee
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development and training has been established in order to identify and address
any emerging skill shortages. This has included, for example, the direct
involvement of all manufacturing staff in a customer-led programme of value
stream mapping. In order to achieve the high levels of flexibility needed for
operations, it is important that staff, including those involved in direct
manufacturing, are multi-skilled. As a result of the competence analysis, at the
time of implementation, a need for additional leadership was suggested.
However, successful company operation since implementation has developed
the leadership skills of the transferred managers, and thus to date, the need to
recruit additional leadership has been averted.
Development of competencies by remote workers. As part of the programme
of employee development and training, all manufacturing staff employed by
the company have been trained to use the ERP/manufacturing software. This
enables them to undertake manufacturing support and administrative tasks,
such as raising manufacturing orders, booking-in goods, and raising orders for
consumables, etc. This includes staff based at the remote motor assembly site.
Additionally, the home-based company product service engineer has been
trained to use electronic mail in order to improve his effectiveness.
Current organisational and business situation at TLCML
In terms of business performance, TLCML has been operating independently of
its sister and parent for more than two years. At the start of the paper it was
asserted that a true virtual manufacturer has no in-house manufacturing
capability at all. TLCML assembles both the motors and the controllers
in-house. It additionally undertakes product test prior to dispatch. The scarcity
of suppliers with the requisite skills for motor manufacture and the ready
availability for purchase of the former licensee’s motor facility, led to this
activity also being carried out in-house, albeit remotely. A practical
consideration that has influenced the company structure and strategy is the
bulk and weight of the finished products and of the raw materials used for
manufacture. Resulting high transportation costs preclude the use of
geographically-distant manufacturers for much of the product-build, and
realistically restrict network partners to those close to the existing
manufacturing network. Thus, practical and business considerations have
resulted in an organisational form that is not truly virtual.
However, manufacturing labour costs account for only 9 per cent of the cost
of sales, while materials (with an annual spend of £1.5 million) represent 58 per
cent – a split that is indicative of the importance placed on external sources of
supply. If used as a measure of virtualness, the apportionment of direct costs at
TLCML suggests that it is approaching the theoretical virtual business model.
(An interesting, but separate, discussion that results from the work presented
in this paper is the measurement of an organisation’s virtuality (Sugden and
Webster, 2002).)
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As it continues to operate, the company is seeking to extend its virtuality in
order that it can enter new markets and exit old ones, following market
demand, without the burden of having to increase or decrease manufacturing
facilities and resources. Measures to increase the virtual component of its
operations have been identified, including the potential outsourcing of
manufacturing processes from the remote motor production site, to leave only
assembly of motors and controllers as internal functions. The company is
actively investigating this possibility. The company is also considering using
alternative manufacturing partners from within the parent company, and
external to it. Without being articulated as such, the pursuance of virtuality by
this company aligns with a strategy of seeking operational agility. This
accords with the contemporary theoretical arguments put forward for the
adoption of agile and virtual business systems.
The commercial success of the company can be measured by its rapid
growth in sales during the two years of independent operation and by the fact
of excellent profitability achieved in the second full year of trading. Sales in
fiscal year 2000 amounted to £1.1 million which increased to £2.4 million in
2001 (an increase of 118 per cent). Future sales growth will depend on winning
orders from new OEM customers and the introduction of new products with the
existing OEM customer. The company expects sales to grow to £2.9 million in
the third year of trading, an increase of 21 per cent, driven by new product
introductions only. Further significant sales growth is expected in the fourth
year of trading with the launch of a new product for a new OEM customer. In
the first full year of trading, TLCMLmade an operating loss of £127,000 (11 per
cent of sales) which became an operating profit in 2001 of £205,000 (8.4 per cent
of sales). Operating profit for the third year of trading is expected to increase to
£415,000 (14 per cent of sales). The sales and profitability figures for TLCML
for fiscal years 2000 and 2001 are summarised in Figure 2.
Concluding theoretical analysis of the case study
The changing competitive environment requires organisations to review, and
possibly change, their strategies in order to remain competitive (Davies and
Figure 2.
Analysis of TLCML
business performance
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Kochhar, 2000; Barnes and Hunt, 2001, p. 139). Global competition, rapid
technological change and escalating variety are seen as drivers of such change
(Davies and Kochhar, 2000). There is, increasingly, conflict between having
clear strategic intent to provide consistency for short-term action and stability
for long-term planning and having strategic flexibility to facilitate the
changing of strategies in response to new information, and business conditions
(Petersen et al., 2000; Hayes and Pisano, 1995). Operations strategies are fluid,
transitory and will change over time (Lowson, 2002). Thus, in generating
strategy to meet the objectives of protection of its technology, and control over
its exploitation, a technology developer should plan to retain the ability to
switch modes of operation. Changing business circumstances for TLCML in the
1990s, forced it to review its operations and business strategies. These included
changes of company ownership and structure leading to reduced independence
and business freedom, diminishing markets for the sale of the technology and
the need for further investment in the technology development process. Aside
from the links to a rapid technological change, these drivers differ from those
suggested by Davies and Kochhar (2000).
The company chose to extend from an operations strategy of pure outward
technology licensing to develop a second strategy of manufacture based on
virtual principles. Such a move, necessitating the acquisition and/or
development of new competencies can be seen in the light of Schonberger’s
(1996) recommendation for business success “as important as expansion and
growth, per se, is growth of competencies. It’s simply too risky in a turbulent
world to depend again and again on the same resources, products and skills”.
The decision represented the establishment of a novel business stream which,
like all new ventures, carried a risk of failure. Shepherd et al.(2000) note three
types of novelty that contribute to the mortality risk of new ventures: novelty
to the market (i.e. customers not knowing the organisation); novelty in
production (i.e. lack of in-house knowledge and experience with necessary
operations processes) and novelty to management (i.e. a lack of internal
expertise in starting-up and running a business). These three dimensions of
risk are reflected in the analysis framework for virtual businesses (Christie and
Levary, 1998) that was used to analyse the company’s competencies at the
proposal stage.
Characteristics of virtual manufacturing and factors considered critical for
its success were discussed from a theoretical perspective at the start of the
paper. The case of TLCML can be seen to conform to these in some areas and to
discord from them in others. As the company seeks to extend its virtuality, it
aims to move into and out of markets more actively. This will allow it to
configure temporary networks in response to specific business opportunities as
they arise. It differs from much literature-based thinking in its use of IT for
manufacturing management. Although the company has sophisticated
communication technology and considerable IT expertise, it does not use
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advanced integrated software systems to network with customers, suppliers or
subcontractors. In accord with the views of some authors (Lau andWong, 2001,
Katzy and Dissel, 2001), and with the practical experience of another virtual
enterprise (Webster, 2001) business success, using the virtual model, for this
company is not dependent on the use of sophisticated IT. Additionally, in line
with the views of Katzy and Dissel (2001), not using ERP to integrate all
manufacturing partners has not detracted from the operation of the system.
Summary and conclusions
This paper has presented details of an innovative company that has responded
positively and successfully to challenges that it faced within its business
environment. As part of a major strategic re-orientation, it has adopted a
contemporary organisational structure for manufacturing and it has
implemented this by the inventive marshalling and use of physical and
human resources. The significance of this work has two dimensions. For the
industrial community it provides an example of successful strategic transition.
While not yet achieving total virtuality, the company has shown that moving
towards the concept of the virtual manufacturing system is feasible. Further, it
shows that this concept is not confined to the major well-resourced
organisation, but with leadership, vision and drive, it can be implemented by
the average small company. It additionally demonstrates the existence of a low-
risk intermediate alternative to technology licensing and full-scale
manufacturing for the exploitation of technology. For the academic
community, it demonstrates how the popularised theoretical concept of
virtual organisation can be implemented in practice. The process by which the
necessary competencies were identified and acquired by a single organisation
is of value in developing generic methodologies. Returning to the research
questions that underpinned this work, the paper has shown that the adoption of
the virtual manufacturing model can offer a commercially-viable operations
strategy for the exploitation of product-related technology. It has additionally
validated a theoretical framework of critical success factors for virtual
businesses, by its use to analyse and identify the competencies and capabilities
needed in a particular business situation.
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